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Abstract
Aprion knowledge of failure modes of a system is 
an indispensable information for design of robust 
decentralized hierarchical control schemes. In 
particular inclusion of system faults as part of the 
process under control provides greater flexibility 
for self diagnosis and maintenance of real-time 
systems. By assigning discrete states to the 
process under control, an "artificial 
consciousness" can be created within the 
controller which allows the controller to exercise 
selective actions for each given discrete state. This 
concept has been implemented to control the 
utility systems of the Space Station Laboratory 
Simulator.
Introduction
Although in many situations "a stitch in time saves 
nine", it is an underestimate when it comes to 
spacecraft fault management. It is well known that 
a prompt fault management for a spacecraft saves 
the lives of the onboard crew members. Case in 
point is the dramatic 1985 explosion of the space 
shuttle Challenger which indeed was preventable 
if proper fault management techniques were 
exercised. Complex and life critical large scale 
systems (and space station is no exception) need 
not generate myriad of alarms and expect the 
operator or the crew members to acknowledge 
them on a timely manner to prevent potential 
failures. What really is needed is a systematic 
fault detection, isolation and recovery scheme.
This paper attempts to describe a methodology for t
fault management, which could not have been 
implemented without the recent advances in 
hardware and software technology. Although the 
concept of state machines [2] is very mature and it 
has been successfully utilized for design of digital 
computers, only recently researchers are 
beginning to apply the technique directly to 
process control (i.e no conversion of state 
diagrams to sequential codes by a programmer, 
which itself results in software faults and thus 
defeats the purpose).
The environment that this state machine can be 
realized is described next.
ICON Based Application Generator
The advent of microcomputer technology along 
with new developments in computer languages 
have given rise to a number of highly 
sophisticated intelligent controllers and work 
stations that can assist the control engineer in the 
design of control strategies with virtually no direct 
intervention from the software engineers [7]. 
Although, general purpose conventional 
computer languages such as Fortran, Pascal, C, 
Ada, etc. have been evolved to serve a number of 
disciplines, it has become evident that each 
discipline has its own peculiarities. In particular 
the sequential nature of conventional 
programming languages does not easily lend 
themself to development of control algorithms. 
These facts have led the computer scientists to 
develop computer languages that are more
9-63
suitable for domain specific problems. The domain 
of the problem being specific allows the computer 
scientist to design the system to be data driven. A 
very familiar example of a data driven system is 
the spread sheet which has found enormous 
popularity among nonprogrammers.
The Application Generator provides an ICON 
based environment where the control engineer 
can graphically represent his control strategies 
and processes under control. Furthermore, the 
control engineer is capable of testing and 
executing his control algorithms without the 
intervention of programmers. This apparent 
decoupling of two disciplines results in higher 
productivity and drastic reduction of cascading 
faults due to hardware/software and process 
interactions.
The Application Generator performs a "knowledge 
capture" in this domain specific environment and 
converts the result to a global database which is 
used by the kernel residing in the controller 
(kernel is a program that does not change even if 
the process under control is modified). Steps for 
this " knowledge capture" are presented next
Representation Of Process Under Control
It is clear that the process under control must be 
described to the intelligent controller before the 
controller takes any control action. This knowledge 
includes, logical partitioning of the process under 
control into a number of subprocesses, sensor 
and actuator relative locations within a 
subprocess, sensor and actuator characteristics, 
and process variable limits. For greater efficiency 
and productivity, ICONs are used extensively to 
generate the graphical representation of the 
process under control. Figure 1 shows the logical 
partitioning of lab module simulator subsystems.
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Figure 1 Subproc««M« of Sp*c« Station Lab Module Simulator
State Programming Concept
Within the context of the Application Generator , 
the state programming is a graphical declarative 
knowledge representation which allows the 
control engineer to designate directly discrete 
states to each subprocess within the overall 
process under control. In addition, the control 
engineer defines the corresponding transition 
conditions. Thus, both the normal states and the 
abnormal states of a subprocess are declared by 
the process control engineer which gives an 
"artificial consciousness" to the overall system. 
This awareness enables the controller to exercise 
selective actions for each given discrete state. 
Furthermore, the concept is naturally suitable for 
fail-safe realization of systems with stringent 
reliability requirements.
Representation Of Process control 
strategies
The control strategies, whether logical or 
analytical, must be defined for each state of a 
given subprocess. For example, due to certain 
failures, the system goes into an emergency state, 
which may call for different order observers and a 
different control law to avoid further propagation 
of failures. ICON based graphical editors 
drastically reduce the huge task of data entry for 
this phase of development.
The Potable Water System - An Example
This example illustrates the application of the Fault 
Detection and Isolation (FDI) algorithm for the 
Potable Water System (PWS) of the Space Station 
using a prototype domain specific Application 
Generator. On this expert process control system 
four types of faults (leaky pipe, stuck valve, pump 
failure, and breached filter) have been 
considered. These are crucial faults which affect 
either the quality or the quantity of the potable 
water reclaimed on the Space Station. An 
Hp-9836 desktop computer and HP3497 data 
acquisition system were used to simulate the PWS 
as well as selected fault conditions which are, in 
turn, monitored by the workstation.
The PWS is designed to reclaim potable water 
from waste water which is produced by the crew 
members and the station operation. Figure 2 
depicts the Space Station PWS. It is composed of 
two input waste water accumulators, one pump 
module, five particle filters, one carbon filter, one 
cation resin bed, one anion resin bed, two 
microbials, and two output potable water storage
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accumulators. A Water Quality Monitor (WQM) 
samples the water and provides information as to 
the quality of treated water.
The output of the WQM can be simply a binary 
signal indicating acceptable or unacceptable 
quality according to a set of values for water 
quality standards. The WQM system can provide 
useful information for component failure detection 
purposes. The component might be the microbial, 
carbon filter, or ion resin exchanger.
The PWS is operating in two modes : Mode 1 is 
the filling mode when water quality is acceptable , 
while Mode 2 is called the recirculating mode 
which occurs when water quality is not acceptable. 
In addition the PWS has two configurations: 
Configuration 1 uses the first output accumulator 
as the water source while the second accumulator 
is being filled. Configuration 2 uses the first 
accumulator for filling and the seccnd as water 
source. The decision for mode switching is a 
function of the signal provided by the WQM and 
conductivity sensors, while the decision for 
configuration switching is a function of the level of 
the output accumulators. A full complement of flow, 
level, pressure, and conductivity sensors provide 
information about the state of the PWS to the 
intelligent controller and ultimately to the central 
processor. Since Mode 1 and Mode 2 can be 
operational only one at a time, the state 
equations for both modes and both configurations 
can be combined by introducing two switches: 
Switch 1 (SO and Switch 2 (S 2 ). The switches 
modify the components of the A matrix of the state 
space model. The definition of the switches and 
the state space representation of the PWS model 
is given as:
Analog state vector:
XT = [X 1 ,X2 ,...,X6]T (1) 
UT=[Ull U2f U3 ]T (2)
The discrete states are defined by two switches: 
S =[81,82] (3)
Where:
{ 1 —^ Mode 1 (water quality ok) (4) 0 —*> Mode 2 (recycle)
{ 1 —^ Output accumulator 1 is being depleted ,^ 0 -^ Output accumulator 1 
is being filled
The state space model of the PWS is defined by:
X =AX+BU 
Where:
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: Flow rate of the system 
: Inertia of the fluid mass
PWS Fault Detection Schemes
The goals of the Intelligent Control (1C) design are 
to develop a fault detection and isolation scheme 
which: (1) maximizes the sensitivity to component 
failure , and (2) minimizes the* rate of the failure 
detection-false alarms. Usually these two design 
goals involve conflicting criteria and the 1C design 
is called upon to optimize the tradeoff.
The proposed methodology exploits a 
combination of signal validation techniques based 
upon a parity space representation, analytic 
redundancy, and artificial intelligence [1]. These 
tools guarantee its sensitivity to subtle failure 
modes that are transparent to most techniques.
Since the prototype Application Generator used 
provides only for single-input single-output and 
two-inputs single-output mathematical ICONS, It is 
impossible to manipulate array arithmetic 
operations and time series analysis using the 
particular configuration. The proposed parity 
space techniques usually involve a large number 
of operations and cannot be applied in this case 
due to the limitations imposed by the present state 
of Application Generator technology.
The fault decision logic is simply a binary type and 
the Intelligent Controller produces a status report 
detailing the fault type and its location through a 
color display and a speech synthesizer. The 
controller finally decides as to what appropriate 
control action must be taken in order to isolate the 
fault and avoid a catastrophic event.
For purposes of illustrating the adopted 
methodology, let us consider one of the critical 
PWS fault conditions, that of a leaky pipe 
segment. It is obvious that a leaky pipe may cause 
severe damage to vital station components, as 
well as bring about a reduction in the available 
water resource. Among basic assumptions we 
consider that all sensor data have been validated
with only simple faults to be detected at any time. 
Furthermore, the design of the Intelligent 
Controller is based upon a knowledge of the 
noise bias characteristics of the sensors and the 
noise and error propagation behavior of the 
analytic models.
An analytic measurement is expressed as some 
functional dependence on values of variables, 
which are obtained from process measurements. 
The latter are always associated with 
measurement uncertainties and bias errors. In 
general, an analytic measurement may be
expressed as f(x 1 , x2 , ...,xn). If e = [ e 1 , e2 ,...,en ] 
represents the error bound vector 
corresponding to the direct set of measurements 
{x 1 ,x2 ,...,x n}, then , under worst case conditions, 
the analytic estimate of the error threshold may be 
obtained as:
E,.e af/axl+e at/ax at/ax. at/ax.
Or simply:
e - <£ (8)
Digital processing of data is performed by both the 
Global and the Intelligent Controller, while the 
actual data to the actuators and from the sensors 
are analog. Analog signals must be converted to 
digital form during the sampling process. Because 
of the finite word length inherent in digital signal 
processing, the quantized errors introduced by the 
Analog to Digital conversion process can be 
expressed by the following equations:
Sq =(0.5) k+ 1 x100%
where:
(9)
Sq : Relative quantization error
k : Number of bits of the A/D device
In our particular implementation k was 11 bits 
which implies a quantization error of 
less than .03% which was an order of magnitude 
smaller than sensor and actuator accuracies, and 
therefore can be ignored without any significant 
impact on the overall error threshold due to 
combined sensor/actuator accuracies.
The use of error theshold for the purpose of leak 
detection is described next.
Leak Detection for Pipe Segment 1
Figure 2 shows pipe segment 1 which is 
represented by solid lines and cut set {A, B, C}. In 
this segment F2 is a flow sensor for q2i F1 is a 
flow sensor for q 1 and F4 represents q4 . A mass 
conservation principle dictates that a leak occurs 
when there is a discrepancy between the net
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R 
P 
A
h in
hout
huse
Resistance of the system 
Pressure raised by the pump 
Area of the accumulator 
Level of the input accumulator 
Level of the output accumulator 
Level of the user accumulator
Input vector U is :
u3
qin : Flow rate °f ' nPut waste water
Qref : Reference flow
quse : Flow rate of water being used
And the states are defined as:
xi=q 
x2 =hin
xs =hout
x4 = V (Pump motor voltage)
Q;(Q =
X7
The remaining coefficients are constant process 
parameters. Since the transition matrix <£(A) is a 
function of 81 and S2 , any change of state by 
these switches will require rapid matrix inversion 
(by Pade approximation of order (1,1) or namely 
bilinear transformation), other multi-step 
techniques such as (Runge Kutta) also require 
inordinate amount of CPU time which exceeds the 
computer processing power. Therefore, the 
modified Euler algorithm with variable integration 
time step was adopted to propagate the state 
equation in real-time using an HP9836 computer.
Figure 3 depicts the control structure for the 
simulation studies. The function of each block is
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Figure 3 Control Structure lor Real-Time Simulation Studies
described below.
(1) Intelligent Controller:
The Intelligent Controller is designed to perform 
the following three tasks:
• Sensor data management
• Sensor data validation
• Fault detection and identification
The Intelligent Controller monitors the system and 
provides diagnostic messages to the maintenance 
crew when a fault is detected. Also the controller 
constantly minimizes the errors between the 
process variables and the commanded set points.
(2) Global Controller:
The Global Controller (the workstation computer) 
receives the down linked signals from the 
Intelligent Controller and monitors the system. 
Furthermore, it performs the following tasks:
• Generates set points which are transmitted to 
the Intelligent Controller
• Monitors the system states
• Provides Man-Machine Interface
The- Global Controller communicates with the 
Intelligent Controller and other auxiliary 
processors thru a Local Area Network.
(3) Flow Model:
The flow model simulates the dynamics of the 
PWS. The model receives information about 
system resistance from the water quality model. 
The state space representation of this model is 
given by Equation (3) which is propagated in 
real-time using the HP9836 and is transmitted to 
the HP3497 data acquisition system and finally to 
the intelligent controller.
(4) Water Quality Model (Particle Model):
The water quality model simulates the flow 
resistance of the PWS. Since the nominal system 
flow rate is very small (in the order of micro (meter 
cube)/sec), we may assume that the flow 
resistance of the system is concentrated at the 
particle filters. The resistance presented by piping 
and other components is so small that it can be 
neglected.
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inflow and the net outflow (the discrepancy should 
be greater than the error threshold). Then, for 
segment 1, we have:
Inflows:
q4 : Direct measurement of the flow sensor F4 
q2 : Direct measurement of the flow sensor F2
Net inlfow:
QNM = 32 + 94 
Out flows:
(10)
q : Direct measurement of the flow sensor F1 
qL1 : Analytic measurement of level sensor L1
qL1 = (2A)(dL1/dt) (11) 
Where 
A = Area of one input accumulator
Net outflow:
qNoi = q + qu 02)
Applying the conservation law to find discrepancy:
l<fe + q4 - q - qu I 0 3)
The measurement error associated with the above 
equations can be derived as the maximum error 
criterion. For maximum flow , q f is the nominal 
flow, i.e. 1.82 litters/hour, then:
Aqd1 1 .82 x 0.1 x 4 =0.0073 litters/hour (1 4)
As it is pointed out earlier, the uncertainty analysis 
was not implemented due to the limitations 
imposed by the prototype Application Generator. 
For binary decision without false alarming, the 
measurement error (reasonable tolerance level) is 
taken as 0.15 litters/hour (from the simulation 
results) which is considered to be the threshold for 
all leaky pipes.
Now we can state the decision rule for fault in 
segment 1:
If qd1 > 0.15 litters/hour, then pipe segment 1 is 
leaky
If qd1 < 0.15 litters/hour, then pipe segment 1 is 
not leaky
Similar procedures are used to define faults in 
other pipe segments. Typical FDI simulation
results are shown in Figure 4. The fault detection 
algorithm monitors the system at all times through 
the sensor data management system. The fault 
simulation module is triggered by the specific fault 
introduced from the keyboard. Since the PWS is a 
series configuration, the only way to isolate a 
leaky pipe segment is to stop the pump and 
terminate, temporarily, system operation.
Actual implementation is described next. 
Implementation
The commercial Application Generator used was 
an ICON-1000 a product of Data Acquisition 
System of Boston Mass . The work station of this 
intelligent control system uses an IBM-XT with 
enhanced touch sensitive display, while the 
controllers are based on Motorola 68000.
The overall process to be controlled is shown in 
Figure 1. The PWS is a subsystem within the 
overall lab module simulator and it is logically 
partitioned into 5 subprocesses. These
H2O Flow rate (10 A -6)(m A 3)/sec 
H2O Usage (10A-6)(m A3)/sec
• Output Storage §1 Level (0.1)(m)
- Output Storage 92 Level (0.1)(fn'
TIME (MINUTES)
Figure 40 PWS State variable evolution
subprocess are grouped inside the dashed box 
labeled PWS. Due to space limitations only the 
OUT_ACCU (output accumulators) subprocess 
will be described here. This subprocess is 
expanded in Figure 5. Similarly all of the 
remaining 15 subprocess are expanded, (but are 
not shown here). The expanded subprocesses 
show the component interaction and 
sensor-actuator location. The corresponding state 
diagram for each subprocess is entered next. 
Figure 6 depicts the states of the OUt-ACCU 
subprocess. The MAINTAIN state is fail-safe state 
where the operator is notified about the nature of 
the problem. The transition definition from 
NORMAL to MAINTAIN is shown in Figure 7.
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Figure 5 INP-ACCU Subprocesa Expnaded
Figure 6 State* of INP-ACCU Subproceaa
Figure 7 Graphical Representation of Leak Detection for Segment 1
Concluding Remarks
The Intelligent Controller described in this paper 
uses a simplified fault detection and- isolatoin 
algorithm in conjunction with an ICON-based 
environment to represent a subsystem - in this
case the Potable Water System of the Space 
Station's common module - the control strategies 
associated with the subsystem as well as the fault 
management techniques. The utility of . the 
approach is demonstrated with the PWS example. 
Obvious advantage of the Application Generator 
include increased design flexibility and reliability. 
The study has also revealed some disadvantages 
of existing technology referring primarily to the 
limited availability of tools for representing 
large-scale dynamic systems which, in turn, limits 
considerably the application domain. Future efforts 
must focus on the development of more powerfull 
state machines capable of expanding their domain 
of applications within the specific domain of 
process control.
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